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CAN CONSPIRACY THEORY SOLVE THE
"OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM"?
RANDALL DAVID MARKS*
Plaintiffs in antitrust litigation traditionally prove price fixing by
presenting direct evidence of direct communication among the de-
fendants: at trial, a witness who earlier participated in price fixing
discussions testifies against his or her co-conspirators. This ap-
proach, relying on evidence of clandestine deals hatched in "smoke
filled hotel rooms," has worked in many markets, but it fails to rem-
edy more subtle forms of collusive behavior.
Oligopoly markets, in particular, present intractable problems
of proof in antitrust litigation.' Absent direct evidence of collusion,
courts require at least some circumstantial evidence of enjoinable
conduct which, taken together with evidence of consciously parallel
business behavior,' proves that an improper agreement to restrain
competition exists. As participants in a market characterized by
only a small number of competitors, oligopolists have a unique abil-
ity to coordinate their business decisions. Theoretically, when a
market is structured to allow perfect competition, buyers and sellers
have no ability to influence the market price-instead, market forces
ensure that price will equal marginal cost. Because of the small
number of competitors in an oligopoly, however, each firm has the
theoretical power to influence the price/output options available to
itself and others. As a result, government enforcement agencies and
academics fear that oligopolists can achieve supracompetitive pric-
ing without detection.
Over the last decade, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or
the Commission) has tackled the oligopoly problem using two novel
approaches. First, the Commission attempted a structural remedy
* B.S. Econ. 1977, M.B.A. 1979, J.D. 1980, University of Pennsylvania. Attorney,
Evaluation Office, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission. The views ex-
pressed herein are not necessarily those of the Commission or any of its members or
staff.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eastern Economic Association
Convention on March 22, 1985. I want to thank my FTC colleagues Malcolm Coate,
Kenneth Davidson, John B. Kirkwood, and David Pender, as well as Greg Rogers of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission and Joseph Craycraft of the University of Cincin-
nati, for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 17-18 (describing oligopoly market model).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 61-63.
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by trying to eliminate the cause of the problem-highly concen-
trated markets-rather than attempting to police the conduct of
oligopolists. The government hoped to deconcentrate industries
whose dominant firms engaged in noncompetitive behavior by
showing that the industry structure constituted a "shared monop-
oly' 3 and then ordering divestitures. It tested this shared monopoly
theory in the ready-to-eat cereal market,4 but then publicly aban-
doned it when the Commission dismissed its complaint in response
to heavy congressional pressure.5 The length and expense of the
proceeding, uncertainty about judicial acceptance of "shared mo-
nopoly" arguments, and skepticism concerning the likely costs and
benefits of industry restructuring contributed to the lack of congres-
sional support.
Second, the Commission attempted a conduct remedy by trying
to prohibit practices that might facilitate supracompetitive pricing.
3. The meaning of the term "shared monopoly" is elusive. George Hay, for exam-
ple, identifies three interpretations, each of which involves different conduct by oligo-
polists: interdependent pricing, use of facilitating practices, and maintenance of
monopoly power by excluding entrants (which he identifies as the theory tested by the
Commission). Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 439,
472 n.125 (1982).
FTC Commissioner Pertschuk interpreted the Commission's complaint in In re Kel-
logg Co. as "predicated upon the allegation of high concentration, as evidenced by a
three-firm concentration exceeding 80%; poor competitive performance, as measured
by sustained high profits and the absence of price competition; and high barriers to
entry caused by exclusionary conduct of members .... ." 99 F.T.C. 8, 281 (1982) (dis-
senting from denial of complaint counsel's appeal of administrative lawjudge's dismissal
of complaint). Areeda and Turner appear to favor a similar standard: "As with single-
firm monopoly, full feasible relief against shared monopoly should on principle be avail-
able against firms which have engaged in exclusionary conduct having a significant
causal relation to shared monopoly power." P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3 ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 840b (1978).
4. In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 269 (1982) (denying complaint counsel's appeal
dismissal and vacating initial decision).
5. In commenting on the dismissal, Commissioner Bailey stated that the Commis-
sion "should not undertake to restructure an industry under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act without a clear supportive signal from the Congress. In this
case, the signals are, for the present, quite to the contrary - as they were not so appar-
ently in 1972 when this complaint issued." In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 288 (1982)
(separate statement of Commissioner Bailey).
Similarly, the Commission issued a complaint charging eight large petroleum com-
panies with maintaining a shared monopoly but dismissed it after eight years of discov-
ery. In re Exxon Corp., 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981). It also investigated the automobile




In In re Ethyl Corp., the Commission prohibited the use of "facilitat-
ing practices" by lead additives producers without alleging or prov-
ing an agreement.6 In vacating Ethyl Corp., the Second Circuit's
opinion in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission all
but destroyed the facilitating practices approach by imposing proof
requirements that appear as stringent as those for establishing an
agreement, 7 thereby eliminating the benefit of the approach.
Rejection of both the shared monopoly and facilitating practice
approaches has left government agencies and private plaintiffs seek-
ing another theory with which to challenge oligopoly misbehavior.
Richard Posner's "economic approach" to proof of conspiracy ar-
guably provides such a theory. It would not compel courts to aban-
don the requirement that the plaintiff allege a collusive agreement
or conspiracy; rather, the plaintiff would use economic evidence to
prove agreement without showing actual communication among the
defendants. Because it fits more easily into the traditional legal
framework, Posner's approach avoids some of the limitations of the
shared monopoly and facilitating practice approaches. Posner ar-
gues that "[i]f the economic evidence . . .warrants an inference of
collusive pricing, there is neither legal nor practical justification for
requiring evidence that will support the further inference that the
collusion was explicit rather than tacit." 8 Posner thus would impose
liability under the traditional Sherman Act theory of conspiracy to
restrain competition. He expands the reach of traditional conspir-
acy theory, however, by emphasizing use of "economic evidence"-
evidence of economic structure, conduct, and performance-to
show collusion, rather than the "cops and robbers" approach of
seeking evidence of interfirm communication.9 In effect, he focuses
attention on the result of collusive behavior (anticompetitive pric-
ing) rather than on the means by which the results are obtained (en-
joinable conduct).
6. The Commission prohibited the use of delivered pricing, advance notice of price
increases, and most favored nations clauses. it re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983),
jud. vacated sub nom. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
See generally Clark, Price-Fixing Without Collusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices
After Ethyl Corp., 1983 Wis. L. REV. 887 (1983) (providing an excellent and comprehen-
sive legal and economic analysis of facilitating practices).
7. 729 F.2d at 139.
8. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER
MATERIALS 341 (2d ed. 1981); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
71 (1976) (identical language).
9. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 47.
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Posner proposes a two-step analysis for determining when eco-
nomic evidence justifies an inference of collusive pricing. First, one
identifies "those markets in which conditions are propitious for the
emergence of collusion."' Second, one determines "whether col-
lusive pricing in fact exists in such a market.""I To facilitate the
latter task, Posner identifies nine factors' 2 that indicate collusive
behavior. 13
If a court finds a violation according to these criteria, Posner
argues that "[t]he appropriate remedy in a collusion case is the same
regardless of the nature of the evidence used to support the infer-
ence of collusion: an injunction, fine, or damage award which allows
the defendants complete competitive flexibility, and forbids only the
(explicit or tacit) collusive agreement itself."' 4 In other words, Pos-
ner is not proposing a new cause of action with a special remedy,
but rather, in his view, a slight modification of the evidentiary re-
quirements for a Sherman Act collusion case.'
5
10. Posner identifies the following conditions as favorable to collusion: (1) high
seller concentration, (2) no fringe of small sellers, (3) inelastic demand at competitive
price, (4) long entry time, (5) many customers, (6) homogeneous product, (7) principal
firms selling at the same level of distribution, (8) price competition relatively important,
(9) high ratio of fixed to variable costs, (10) static or declining demand, (11) sealed
bidding, and (12) past anticompetitive behavior. Id. at 55-61; R. POSNER & F. EASTER-
BROOK, supra note 8, at 336-38.
11. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 55.
12. The factors are: (1) stable relative market shares, (2) price discrimination, (3)
exchange of price information, (4) regional price variations, (5) identical bids, (6) sud-
den price, output, and capacity changes (which may mark the formation of a cartel), (7)
industry-wide resale price maintenance, (8) declining market shares of industry leaders,
and (9) price positively related to concentration. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra
note 8, at 339-40. Concerning the last factor, Posner explains that "assuming plausibly
that a cartel will be more effective the more concentrated the market is, we would expect
price in a cartelized market to move with changes in concentration, and in the same
direction." Id. at 340.
13. Posner's list was a bit different in 1976. See R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 55-75.
The ninth factor (the price/concentration relationship) is new, while four factors in-
cluded in 1976 - amplitude and fluctuation of price changes, demand elasticity at mar-
ket price, level and pattern of profits, and basing point pricing - are no longer listed.
Posner and Easterbrook state that the amplitude, frequency, and direction of price
changes "sometimes might be instructive." R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 8,
at 340. Nothing is said about demand elasticity at market price or basing point pricing,
although subsequent discussion indicates that basing point pricing can be anticompeti-
tive. Id. at 345. Posner has apparently changed his position concerning profits: the
casebook concludes that profits are not a very good indication of the existence of a cartel
although "[i]t may be more promising to look at the profits of the fringe producers,"
which will increase after a cartel forms. Id. at 341 n.5.
14. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 65.
15. Thus, although strongly criticizing the traditional view of oligopoly behavior as
expounded by Donald Turner, see infra text accompanying notes 34-50, Posner describes
the issue dividing him and Turner as "the narrow one [of] whether some evidence of
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This Article explores the usefulness of Posner's conspiracy ap-
proach to plaintiffs faced with the "oligopoly problem." Does the
caselaw suggest that conventional theories of conspiracy, coupled
with economic evidence alone, can be used effectively to attack an-
ticompetitive behavior by oligopolists?
To answer this question, part I begins with a brief economic
analysis of oligopoly behavior itself. Economists have debated the
extent to which oligopolists can achieve supracompetitive pricing
without an explicit agreement. Part I reviews this debate to demon-
strate that economic analysis cannot easily distinguish competitive
performance by oligopolists from noncompetitive performance.
Apparently in response to the economic uncertainties involved, the
courts have assumed that oligopolists can price noncompetitively
without reaching an agreement. They therefore demand at least cir-
cumstantial evidence of an "agreement."
Part II reviews the general law of circumstantial proof of agree-
ment in the context of antitrust litigation. While courts have not
demanded that a plaintiff prove the terms of an agreement to find
liability for collusion, they have universally refused to infer agree-
ment from evidence of noncompetitive performance alone, perhaps
because of their assumption that noncompetitive performance can
result from unilateral behavior. The rule of "conscious parallelism
plus" exemplifies this middle-of-the-road approach to the oligopoly
problems. Posner's economic approach is consistent with the thrust
of this rule, but because he argues that significant noncompetitive
performance does not exist absent an illegal agreement, he would
allow the economic evidence to stand alone.
Part III analyzes specific cases to ascertain, with as much preci-
sion as possible, the courts' willingness to find collusion when con-
fronted by various kinds of circumstantial evidence. Evaluation of
such evidence tends to become highly subjective, however, given the
factual complexities involved and our limited understanding of eco-
nomic relationships. Thus, even at its best, antitrust litigation has
been fraught with uncertainty. Nevertheless, some patterns emerge
from the caselaw. To explore these effectively, the cases have been
organized into three groups according to the analytical problems
presented. Subsection A briefly discusses the "easiest" cases: those
involving obvious concerted action, but in which the court must find
actual communication among the alleged colluders should be required, as corroboration
for the economic evidence." Id. at 76.
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a link between the concerted action and noncompetitive perform-
ance. Typically, these cases involve trade associations that have co-
ordinated industry-wide use of various facilitating practices
(delivered pricing, for example). Subsection B discusses cases in
which the courts have been asked to infer, from conduct and per-
formance evidence, that firms secretly and expressly agreed to fix
prices. Subsection C turns to implicit agreement cases, in which the
court knows what the firms have done and must decide whether
such conduct shows sufficient commitment to warrant implying an
agreement.
Part IV contains my conclusions concerning the limited utility
of Posner's approach as a solution to the oligopoly problem. The
courts refuse to accept economic evidence of noncompetitive per-
formance alone as proof of conspiracy. Moreover, when such evi-
dence is used, it is likely to be more ambiguous than Posner
assumes. However, it is at least theoretically possible to prove an
antitrust violation without direct evidence that the defendants com-
municated among themselves, and a few cases have resulted in lia-
bility based on either an inferred or implied agreement with only
minimal evidence of direct communication. While the conspiracy
framework probably will not be expanded as far as Posner recom-
mends, for now his approach seems to be the only viable way to
attack the more subtle forms of oligopolist misbehavior.
I. EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM
Economic analysis is insufficiently refined to detect price fixing
by oligopolists with a high degree of confidence. Because the small
number of competitors in an oligopoly arguably allows the member
firms to coordinate their behavior without a formal agreement, dis-
tinguishing collusive from noncollusive behavior on the basis of
economic evidence is inherently difficult.
A. The Nature of an Oligopoly
Economists have traditionally defined three primary market
structure models: perfect competition, monopoly, and oligopoly.' 6
The perfect competition model assumes many identical buyers and
sellers of an identical product blessed by perfect information and
16. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 9-44, 151-168 (2d ed. 1980); Hay, supra note 3, at 443-44. A fourth model,
monopolistic competition, relaxes the competitive assumption of homogeneous prod-
ucts. See infra note 17.
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easy entry and exit. Economic theory maintains that in such a mar-
ket, the "invisible hand" of competition causes price to equal margi-
nal cost and promotes the optimal allocation of resources in all
markets. For our purposes, the most crucial assumption of the per-
fect competition model is that buyers and sellers lack discretion over
pricing. As "price takers," they may choose to buy or sell at the
market price, but they cannot influence that price.
The monopoly model also assumes many buyers, an identical
product, and perfect information but, of course, only one seller pro-
tected from new entrants. Rather than being a price taker, the mo-
nopolist is a price setter. Price is a function of the monopolist's
output subject to the constraint of a negatively sloped demand
curve. Any price increase is accompanied by a corresponding re-
duction in the quantity sold. To maximize its profits, the monopo-
list sets its output so that marginal cost equals marginal revenue.' 7
Absent significant economies of scale, output is lower and the equi-
librium price is higher in a monopoly market than they would be in a
competitive market. The resulting resource allocation is
suboptimal.
The oligopoly model assumes many buyers, an identical prod-
uct,1 8 entry barriers, and perfect information, but assumes a small
number of competing firms. Each firm influences the price/output
options available to its rivals. Thus, in theory, firms can choose to
behave either independently or interdependently. Independent be-
havior ignores the reactions of other firms. Interdependent behav-
ior, on the other hand, is behavior that is rational only if
competitors behave similarly. For example, an interdependent price
increase is one that maximizes profits only if competitors match it.
Interdependent behavior can range from unilateral business deci-
sions, which take reactions by rivals into account, to fullblown car-
tels, which achieve results little different from a monopoly. As in all
17. The degree of market power over price in a monolopistic market is restricted by
the availability of a large number of close, but imperfect, substitutes. There are many
buyers and sellers, easy entry and exit, and perfect information, but firms sell differenti-
ated products and thus have some degree of individual market power. While perform-
ance will be somewhat noncompetitive, firms in a monopolistically competitive market
have only a little more market power (ability to influence price) than firms in a competi-
tive market.
18. An oligopoly can also exist if firms sell differentiated products although such
differentiation makes collusion more difficult. See F. SCHERER, supra note 16, at 200-05.
But see Davidson, The Competitive Significance of Segmented Markets, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 445,
455-59 (1983), suggesting that the individual market power created by product differen-
tiation makes competitive problems in an oligopoly more serious.
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small-number cases, the degree of coordination achieved is idiosyn-
cratic. The greater the coordination of behavior, however, the
greater the industry's collective profits. The resulting price and out-
put will fall somewhere between the levels found in a monopoly and
those found in a perfect competition market, with the result deter-
mined by the degree of coordination achieved.
B. Coordinated Behavior-and Misbehavior
To elevate prices or restrict output, and thereby earn
supracompetitive profits, firms must accomplish several tasks. First,
they must establish a consensus price or price schedules.' 9 The
greatest threat to the ensuing price-fixing agreement is the urge to
cheat. Since the price fixed by the colluding firms is above marginal
cost, a firm can charge just under the collusive price and sell addi-
tional output. The second task of colluders, therefore, is to enforce
the consensus by detecting and punishing cheaters. In addition,
firms that are not parties to the conspiracy may undercut the con-
sensus by expanding their output, entering the market, or selling
substitute products. Unless the structure of the market-or the ac-
tions of the colluders-prevents erosion of the collusive price from
competition by fringe firms, entrants, and substitute products, the
price-fixing agreement will soon deteriorate.2z
The ease with which firms can accomplish these tasks deter-
mines the likelihood that they will decide to collude.2 ' Market char-
acteristics, in turn, affect the ease or difficulty of accomplishing
these tasks. For example, as the number of sellers in a market de-
creases, agreement among them becomes easier to reach. 22 More-
over, cheating is easier to detect in markets in which demand is
19. Moreover, having set a collusive price, the firms must then allocate sales among
themselves.
20. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was beyond the
reach of American antitrust law and thus in theory had the opportunity to create a long-
lasting cartel. OPEC, however, has had some difficulty reaching a consensus, in part
because oil has many grades and the oil producing nations have varying interests. More-
over, the cartel has been unable to prevent cheating by its members. Finally such non-
OPEC members as Great Britain have undercut its price and consumers have substituted
other forms of energy (coal, natural gas, conservation) for oil. For these reasons, OPEC
has lost its once firm control over oil prices.
Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit asserts that "[c]artels ... rarely last
five years." Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 33 (1984).
21. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 47. The costs of gathering information, negotiating
consensus prices and output levels, monitoring the agreement, and punishing cheaters
are often called the transaction costs of collusion. If these costs are high relative to the
expected gains from collusion, collusion will not occur.
22. Other structural factors also influence the ease with which a common price may
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stagnant and predictable rather than growing explosively: if the col-
luders begin to lose market shares, they will suspect cheating.
Having few rivals, oligopolists are more likely than firms in
more competitive markets to have the ability and incentive to col-
lude. Oligopolists can coordinate their business decisions in three
ways: by interdependence, express agreement, or implicit agree-
ment. 23 Agreements to fix prices are of course illegal, whether ex-
press or implied. By contrast, interdependent pricing, in which the
firms set prices24 unilaterally but in anticipation of their rivals' reac-
tions, is legal. Interdependent pricing is characterized by
"nonenjoinable conduct," that is, by conduct that cannot be sensi-
bly controlled through an injunction, because such an order must be
extremely (if not impractically) complex and regulatory to produce
its desired effect. Under this definition, virtually all authorities
would characterize a firm's interdependent price and output deci-
sions as nonenjoinable conduct and, therefore, legal.25 Interdepen-
dent pricing, however, may prove ineffective because lack of
communication creates too much uncertainty among the firms. In-
deed, Posner and others reject the notion that interdependent pric-
ing alone can elevate price above a competitive level.26
To increase the effectiveness of their price fixing, firms may en-
gage in "enjoinable conduct." 2 7 Enjoinable conduct is any activity
be established, e.g., the number of variables on which agreement must be reached and
the degree to which the firms perceive their interests in the same way. Thus firms find it
fairly easy to reach a consensus on a homogeneous product with few variations, e.g.,
corn, but more difficult to reach a consensus on a differentiated product of various sizes
and quality, e.g., automobiles. But cf. Davidson, supra note 18, at 455-59. Moreover,
firms with similar cost functions, market shares, and expectations of the future will find it
easier to agree because all their interests are likely to be served by the same level of
prices. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 10; F. SCHERER, supra note 16, at 169-228.
23. Express and implicit agreements are obviously forms of interdependent behav-
ior. In this article, however, "interdependent behavior" refers only to business deci-
sions made with recognition of rivals' responses but without the commitment necessary
to establish an express or implicit agreement.
24. Alternatively, firms may restrict output or engage in particular business prac-
tices, e.g., delivered pricing, based on assumptions about their competitors' probable
responses.
25. E.g., Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelisn
and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 669-70 (1962) (reviewing the difficulties of
fashioning a remedy to interdependent pricing).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 31-40.
27. The most effective method of coordinating business decisions is by merging to
create a monopoly. Merger policy is beyond the scope of this paper. It is, however,
worth noting that to the extent that firms can price noncompetitively without reaching
an agreement, a vigorous antimerger policy may be warranted. To the extent that non-
competitive performance is difficult without an agreement, or that the government can
detect anticompetitive agreements, a more relaxed policy may be appropriate.
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for which a simple conduct order is an effective and constructive
remedy if the activity is judged harmful. In the price fixing context,
it is useful to distinguish between two types of enjoinable conduct:
(1) direct communication (for example, meetings) and (2) facilitat-
ing practices, which are other forms of avoidable conduct that assist
in the coordination of pricing and output levels. Examples of facili-
tating practices include the maintenance of delivered pricing sys-
tems, the use of price books and particular contract clauses (such as
"most favored nations" clauses), and the exchange of price
information.
2 8
Enjoinable conduct that affects price or output is generally un-
lawful. The law treats express agreements about prices particularly
harshly. Not only may a court award treble damages to a victim of
price fixing, but the price fixers themselves may face jail terms. As a
result, firms virtually always communicate secretly when forming ex-
press agreements regarding prices, output levels, or practices that
facilitate supracompetitive pricing. Alternatively, to lessen the risk
of detection, firms may engage in conduct that provides enough cer-
tainty to elevate price or restrict output, but falls short of a formal
agreement. For example, firms may merely exchange price informa-
tion. In either case, the small number of firms in an oligopoly will
make illegal coordination easier both to accomplish and to hide.
C. The Heart of the Oligopoly Problem
Because oligopolists have a special ability and incentive to col-
lude, antitrust scholars and enforcement agencies have long been
troubled by the possibility that they are behaving noncompetitively.
To remedy such behavior, however, courts must be able to distin-
guish illegal agreements from legal, interdependent conduct. The
issue at the heart of the "oligopoly problem" is whether oligopolists
can price noncompetitively in the absence of explicit agreement. In
other words, does the existence of noncompetitive performance
(price above marginal cost, restricted output, or high profits) indi-
cate that firms have secretly fixed prices? If oligopolists can coordi-
nate their behavior only by engaging in enjoinable conduct, then
evidence of noncompetitive performance itself is strong evidence of
secret enjoinable conduct. Further evidence about conduct would
be unnecessary.
Classical economic theory assumes that in an oligopoly in which
each seller knows the precise shape of the demand curve and its own
28. See Clark, supra note 6: Hay,, supra note 3.
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and its rivals' cost curves, firms will price interdependently.2 9 As a
result, price will be above, and output below, the competitive level.
Thus, economists traditionally have believed that oligopolists can
price supracompetitively without communicating.
°
Posner and others question this view. 3' For example, one com-
mentator points out that "it appears that even in highly concen-
trated industries competition is suppressed with great difficulty and
only as a result of deliberate efforts by members of an industry to
reach an express or tacit agreement. '3 2 if even open, explicit agree-
ments regarding price break down, then it seems unlikely that
supracompetitive pricing could be achieved without any agreement
whatsoever. Oligopolistic markets will therefore behave competi-
tively absent some agreement. The turbulent history of OPEC dem-
onstrates the validity of this argument.
33
Posner makes a more theoretical challenge as well, 34 attacking
the premises of the conventional theory as expressed in an influen-
tial article by Donald Turner.35 Turner suggests several reasons
why oligopolists can sometimes achieve supracompetitive perform-
ance without express or tacit agreement. For example, he assumes
that an oligopolist will be reluctant to undercut competitors' prices
because of the speed of detection and retaliation-competitors will
quickly match the new price and any competitive edge gained by the
original cut will be negligible.36 Posner, on the other hand, argues
29. See A. COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THE-
ORY OF WEALTH (N. Bacon trans. 1963).
Some commentators have termed such interdependent pricing "tacit collusion."
E.g., R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 40; Blechman, Conscious Parallelism, Signalling and Facilitat-
ing Devices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
881 (1979). I have used the terms "interdependent pricing" or "interdependent behav-
ior" rather than "tacit collusion" because "collusion" generally connotes some sort of
express agreement.
30. More precisely, they believe that price will normally be above marginal cost in an
oligopoly. F. SCHERER, supra note 16, at 168; Hay, supra note 3, at 443-44; see also Tur-
ner, supra note 25, at 665-71.
31. See, e.g., Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About lonopolv, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRA-
TION: THE NEW LEARNING 166-67 (Goldschmid, Mann, & Weston eds. 1974).
32. Blechman, supra note 29, at 892.
33. See supra note 20. OPEC's power, however, lasted perhaps a decade before
breaking down even though the market for oil is not highly concentrated.
34. R. POSNER, sipra note 8, at 42-46; R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 8, at
332-35.
35. Turner, supra note 25, at 665-73. George Hay appears to agree with the Turner
theory. Hay, supra note 3, at 443-44.
36. Turner, supra note 25, at 665-66.
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that there will be a time lag sufficient to make price cutting worth-
while.3 7 Some of the price cutter's increased sales will come from
new customers responding to lower prices, so that competitors
might not see a sharp decline in their own sales. Hence, in Posner's
view, detection by competitors will be slower than Turner believes.
Posner also criticizes Turner's assumption that oligopolists can
use price leadership to reach a supracompetitive price in the first
place.38 Posner argues that if one member of a market set a
supracompetitive price, a rational competitor would just cut its own
price. If its cheating were detected, the price cutter would quickly
raise its price back to the supracompetitive level of its rivals. Be-
cause Turner's price leadership theory fails to recognize this incen-
tive to cheat, Posner concludes that Turner overestimates
oligopolists' ability to maintain supracompetitive prices through
price leadership alone.39 Posner does not say whether he believes
that pricing in an oligopoly should reach a competitive equilibrium,
but he obviously believes that performance will be significantly bet-
ter than does Turner - unless the firms use enjoinable conduct to
reach and enforce an anticompetitive consensus regarding price or
output.
Finally, Posner explicitly criticizes Turner's assertion that oligo-
polists are merely acting rationally when they refuse to compete on
price. Turner maintains that
the behavior of a rational oligopolist in setting his price is
precisely the same as that of the rational seller in an indus-
try consisting of a very large number of competitors ....
The rational oligopolist simply takes one more factor into
account-the reactions of his competitors to any price
change that he makes.40
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS: CONSPIRACY AND THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
37. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 44.
38. Price leadership occurs when oligopolists base their pricing decisions on the de-
cisions of the price "leader," frequently the industry's dominant firm. Generally, the
price leader initiates a price increase (or decrease) and other firms either match the
increase or announce a different price. There may be several rounds of price announce-
ments before a new consensus price is reached, but the indirect communication may be
as effective as direct negotiations. See F. SCHERER, supra note 16, at 176-84; Hay, supra
note 3, at 446, 453-54; Washburn, Price Leadership, 64 VA. L. REV. 691 (1978).
39. R. POSNER, supra note 8.
40. Turner, supra note 25, at 665.
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of trade .. ,,4" While the plain language of section 1 condemns
literally every restraint of trade, the courts have long interpreted it
to proscribe only "unreasonable" restraints.42 A plaintiff, therefore,
must prove two elements to establish liability under section 1: con-
certed activity and an unreasonable effect.4" This Article focuses on
the first element, concerted action, because the issues surrounding
proof of such activity are central to the oligopoly problem.
The simplest method of establishing concerted activity is to
produce a written contract or some other evidence of an illegal
agreement. Many Justice Department price fixing cases rely primar-
ily on just such evidence: testimony of an executive who had earlier
participated in price fixing discussions.44 A naked (open) agree-
ment regarding price or output is per se illegal, however, and as a
result, virtually all anticompetitive conspiracies are secret. Often di-
rect evidence is unavailable, and circumstantial proof becomes nec-
essary. The following discussion outlines the general law of
circumstantial proof of agreement.
A. Noncompetitive Performance Alone Does Not Prove Collusion
While economists seem to be leaning toward the view held by
Posner45 that oligopolists cannot price noncompetitively absent en-
joinable conduct, the courts have not accepted this premise. The
rule that some proof of enjoinable conduct must exist to support a
finding of price fixing seems firmly established.
Current precedent strongly suggests that interdependent pric-
ing unaccompanied by enjoinable conduct is legal, even if such pric-
ing is supracompetitive. As one court pointed out, "Clearly parallel
pricing alone is insufficient to establish an antitrust violation. In
fact, price identity may be the expected and normal result when the
product is identical or fungible, even though there is no agreement
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
42. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST LAW 165-74 (1977). Sullivan points out that Congress
could not have meant to prohibit every contract that restrains trade. Such an interpreta-
tion would in effect prohibit all contracts because each time a "buyer closes a deal with a
seller, the contract binds both to a particular course and by so doing limits or restrains
the commercial opportunities of other sellers who would like to make the sale and of
other buyers who might have bought the goods." Id. at 164.
43. A plaintiff must also satisfy the section I jurisdictional requirement that the con-
certed activity restrain interstate or foreign commerce.
44. E.g., United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1331-34 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1043 (affirming conviction of real estate brokers for price fixing based on evi-
dence regarding dinner conversation and subsequent attempt to coerce compliance with
consensus price).
45. See supra note 3 1.
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and the costs for the participating companies are not the same."" 6
In reality, however, the results in the case law may have turned as
much on the absence of convincing evidence of poor performance
as on the failure to prove more than supracompetitive perform-
ance.4 7  Nevertheless, the Federal Trade Commission recently
stated that the FTC Act does "not prohibit oligopolistic pricing
alone, even supracompetitive parallel prices, in the absence of spe-
cific conduct which promotes such a result." 4
Judicial unwillingness to accept supracompetitive pricing alone
as dispositive evidence of collusion may result, in part, from histori-
cal accident: the Turner view won acceptance first. The legal pro-
cess, of course, relies heavily on application of existing rules to new
fact situations and, for better or worse, changes direction slowly.
Having once formulated requirements based on the assumption that
supracompetitive prices can exist without collusion and merely as
the result of interdependent pricing, courts seem reluctant to
change their world view and accept Posner's approach.
More fundamentally, the courts are perhaps loath to impose the
46. Federal Trade Commission v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1190
(D.D.C. 1978) (holding evidence insufficient to establish that defendants had violated a
prior FTC order prohibiting price fixing); accord United States v. FMC Corp., 306 F.
Supp. 1106, 1117, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (insufficient evidence of conspiracy to increase
prices in violation of the Sherman Act).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that individual decisions to follow a price
leader does not violate the law. "[T]he fact that competitors may see proper, in the
exercise of their own judgment, to follow the prices of another manufacturer, does not
establish any suppression of competition or show any sinister domination." United
States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1927) (monopolization
case; no evidence of anticompetitive conduct or performance); accord Esco Corp. v.
United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965) (court found defendant's actions
went beyond mere price leadership); Independent Iron Works v. United States Steel
Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 665 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963) (in dictum, court
indicated that similarity of prices in the sale of a standardized product does not by itself
prove collusive price fixing).
47. E.g., State v. SuperAmerica, 559 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mont. 1983). In SuperAmerica
the court rejected Montana's claim that a gas station's consciously parallel pricing, post-
ing of its prices on large signs, and surveys of competitor prices established that it was
colluding with its competitors. The court held that because the parallel pricing was the
result of SuperAmerica's unilateral policy to sell gasoline at a price lower than its com-
petitors, the effect was procompetitive. The court concluded that the station had not
fixed prices because (1) its pricing was consistent with its business interests, (2) it had a
policy of selling at the lowest price in the market, and (3) it had instructed its employees
not to discuss pricing with its competitors, instructions which they apparently obeyed.
Id. at 301.
The station's competitors' complaints to both the station and to the State of Mon-
tana about the station's low prices suggest that the case had no basis. Perhaps as a
result, Montana sued none of the firms with which SuperAmerica allegedly conspired.
48. Ethyl, 101 F.T.C. at 598 (emphasis in original).
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unusually severe sanctions for price fixing absent some certainty
that the alleged perpetrators have in fact colluded. In effect, courts
seem to demand proof of avoidable conduct by competitors as a ba-
sis for presuming that they acted with mens rea, or wrongful intent,
before invoking the full force of the law.4 9 Although mens rea, of
course, is formally required only for criminal liability, it serves in
civil antitrust litigation both to justify imposing severe sanctions and
to delineate types of poor performance that are amenable to judicial
intervention. For if supracompetitive pricing can also result from an
oligopolist's rational evaluation of its market, clearly wrongful in-
tent cannot be proved by demonstrating noncompetitive perform-
ance alone. Enjoinable conduct thus serves as proof of wrongful
intent. Moreover, the rationale for requiring evidence of enjoinable
conduct is strengthened by the complexity and imprecision involved
in measuring performance. While evidence of avoidable conduct is
not equivalent to the testimony of someone present when the firms
conspired, it does assure the court that the treble damage penalty
falls only on those who have taken some avoidable step.
The legal concern about effective remedies suggests an addi-
tional explanation for the different focuses of economics and law.
50
Economists attempt to foster market efficiency and social welfare by
providing accurate descriptive theories and techniques. Conse-
quently, economic tests attempt to measure the results of collusive
behavior rather than the behavior itself. Economic tests for oligop-
olies, therefore, customarily measure deviation from the competitive
equilibrium (Pareto optimality) relative to a monopoly case. The ju-
dicial system, on the other hand, engages in fact-finding to deter-
mine when a limited number of remedies should be employed. A
conduct order regulating pricing would often be impractically com-
plex, overly rigid, and beyond judicial competence. As a result,
legal tests tend to look to the collusive behavior itself, rather than to
the economic results of such behavior, because only certain kinds of
conduct justify imposing legal remedies and only certain kinds of
conduct are amenable to change by those remedies.
Furthermore, since monopoly pricing by a lawful monopolist
(for example, one which obtained its monopoly by patent) is legal,
49. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
50. I am grateful to Professor Joseph Craycraft of the University of Cincinnati for
this observation. Posner also notes that "lawyers ... are more comfortable with conspir-
acy doctrine than price theory .... " R. POSNER, supra note 8. at 41.
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by analogy oligopoly pricing should be legal absent enjoinable con-
duct.5' For all these reasons, courts do not accept supracompetitive
pricing alone as sufficient proof of collusion.
There may be an exception to the basic rule that poor perform-
ance, without more, is insufficient to support an inference of agree-
ment: the case in which firms submit identical sealed bids on
successive occasions and cannot explain why the bids were identical.
No decision has based liability on such evidence,52 but Phillip
Areeda has suggested that identical sealed bids on a custom-made
product would be a factor indicating conspiracy.53 Yet even this
possible exception is at best a poor example of economic evidence
used to prove collusion. Identical bids are convincing not so much
as economic evidence of poor performance, but because they seem
so unlikely to result absent secret communication.
B. Proof of the Terms of an Agreement Is Not Required
While refusing to base a finding of collusion on noncompetitive
performance alone, the courts have never required a plaintiff to
prove -the specific terms of a collusive agreement. Plaintiffs have
often relied upon proof of parallel business behavior in conjunction
with additional evidence sufficient to establish an agreement. To
prove an antitrust violation using circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs
must currently meet a standard referred to as the rule of "conscious
parallelism plus." This section examines that standard, along with
its limitations, and demonstrates that while Posner's "economic ap-
proach" is consistent with the thrust of the rule, it is subject to many
of the same limitations and uncertainties.
1. The Supreme Court's Teachings.-The Supreme Court has ex-
pressly rejected the notion that to prove conspiracy a plaintiff must
prove the details of an agreement to affect price or output. In Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, the Court noted:
No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful
conspiracy.... The essential combination or conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a course of
dealings or other circumstances as well as in any exchange
of words. Where the circumstances are such as to warrant
51. Turner, supra note 25, at 667-68.
52. Several cases have included identical sealed bids as part of the evidence. See, e.g.-
C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
892 (1952).
53. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSls 373-74 (3d ed. 1981).
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a jury in finding that the conspirators had a unity of pur-
pose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting
of minds in an unlawful arrangement, the conclusion that a
conspiracy is established is justified.54
In American Tobacco, perhaps the best known oligopoly case, the
Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict that the three major U.S. to-
bacco companies conspired to restrain trade and monopolize, at-
tempted to monopolize, and monopolized the purchase of leaf
tobacco (the essential raw material) and the sale of cigarettes. 5 5 It is
unclear, however, whether the Court relied on direct evidence of
communication among the firms in reaching this decision. While
the government did offer evidence of a meeting (the only instance of
direct communication it cited),56 the court of appeals did not dwell
on the incident and the Supreme Court did not discuss it at all.
Although the tone of both opinions suggests that neither court
would have reversed the jury verdict even absent evidence of the
meeting,57 the "economic evidence" of parallel behavior offered in
American Tobacco almost shouted the presence of hidden collusive
conduct.58 Thus, while it is likely that the decision would be upheld
54. 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946). Since the Court limited its grant of certiorari to the
appropriateness of the jury instructions regarding the issue of whether actual exclusion
of competitors is necessary to the crime of monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman
Act, 324 U.S. 836 (1944), the Court's discussion was largely dictum.
55. Among the factors on which the Supreme Court relied were the defendants' re-
fusal to purchase tobacco unless all of the defendants were present; their fixing the price
of tobacco and then bidding up the price to the agreed level (so that all tobacco would
be purchased at the same price); their identical list prices and discounts over a period of
years; price leadership; high profits despite the Depression; lack of an economic justifi-
cation for a price rise, selling of some brands at a loss to exclude cheaper competition,
followed by price rises; and the declining market shares of the leaders. 328 U.S. at 800-
01.
56. The appellate court opinion reported that the defendants' representatives met at
least once "with representatives of dealers, jobbers, and other cigarette companies, and
participated in a demand that the 10-cent brands be raised to 11 cents a package .... "
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93, 106 (6th Cir. 1944), aff'd, 328 U.S.
781 (1946).
57. For example, the court of appeals pointed out, "[I]t is settled that the essential
agreement, combination, and conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be implied
from, or found in a course of dealing or other circumstances, as well as through an
exchange of words." Id. at 107. The Supreme Court used almost identical language in
its opinion. 328 U.S. at 809.
58. In many ways, the case presented a classic example of inferred conspiracy. The
defendants together had a 90-plus percent market share when the conspiracy began - a
total which dropped, as expected, in response to new entry and fringe expansion in the
wake of anticompetitive pricing. Prices were consistently uniform and changed (nearly
always upward) infrequently. Profits were high. Moreover, some of the defendants' ac-
tions were completely inexplicable in the absence of a conspiracy, such as their refusal to
purchase tobacco in the absence of their competitors and their purchasing of low grade
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today-because the evidence seems at least as strong as in more re-
cent cases in which liability has been found-the case is weak prece-
dent regarding the use of parallel behavior to prove an antitrust
violation. Its facts are so striking that any modern case would be
easily distinguished.5"
In 1954, several years after American Tobacco, the Supreme
Court's decided the Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distri but-
ing Corp.60 and expressly imposed more stringent requirements for
inferring an agreement from parallel business behavior. After not-
ing that conscious parallelism alone is not enough to establish liabil-
ity under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court added
its famous dictum that "[c]ircumstantial evidence of consciously par-
allel behavior may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judi-
cial attitude toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not
yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely."'" Theatre En-
terprise is distinguishable from American Tobacco on at least two
grounds: there was a jury verdict finding no liability,62 and the de-
fendants offered plausible justifications for their conduct. 63 Regard-
less of the impact these distinctions might have had, the Court's
dictum was unequivocal: plaintiffs must prove more than con-
sciously parallel business behavior.
2. The "Plus Factors" Approach.-To establish that defendants'
behavior is consciously parallel, a plaintiff must prove three
tobacco which was of use only to the new firms trying to underprice them. It is hard to
imagine firms engaging in such blatantly anticompetitive conduct today.
59. Discussed below is a case that may be "the exception which proves the rule."
For discussion of Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D.Cal.
1971), see infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text. It too involved blatant anticompe-
titive conduct where the only direct evidence of communication was the exchange of
price information. The court found the exchange of price information legal and then
largely ignored that finding in holding the evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict
for the plaintiffs.
60. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
61. 346 U.S. at 541. This case concerned the refusal of several film distributors to
allow the plaintiff, a theatre owner, to show their films. The defendants introduced evi-
dence showing an independent business justification for their refusal to deal by arguing
that they normally granted only exclusive licenses for first run pictures and that the
plaintiff did not have a sufficiently large market area to justify such a license. Moreover,
they convincingly attacked plaintiffs good faith. The jury found for the defendants and
the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court should have directed a verdict in its
favor. The Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed.
62. Indeed, it is unlikely, since the burden of proof in a collusion case is on the
plaintiff, that a court could ever rule that liability had been established as a matter of law,
i.e., without submission to the jury.
63. 346 U.S. at 539-40.
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elements: that business behavior was in fact parallel, that competi-
tors "were conscious of each other's conduct," and that "their
awareness was an element in their decisional process."6 4 Proving
these three elements, however, does not end the analysis. To estab-
lish an agreement "a plaintiff who alleges a conspiracy to fix prices
in violation of the Sherman Act must present, along with evidence of
the defendant's consciously parallel pricing behavior, evidence of
something more, of so-called 'plus factors.' "65 A plus factor is
some additional, independent evidence supporting a finding of
agreement to fix prices, refusal to deal, or otherwise restrain
66competition.
The courts have designated certain types of conduct and per-
formance evidence as "plus factors."-6 7 Moreover, they have estab-
lished two general tests for deciding whether particular behavior
qualifies as a "plus factor": whether it is contrary to each firm's in-
dependent self-interest, and whether there is a motive for concerted
action.
(a) Conduct Against Individual Self-Interest.-The most frequently
cited plus factor is conduct contrary to the self-interest of each firm
acting independently. Such behavior is identified by determining,
on a case-by-case basis, whether the conduct at issue would be bene-
ficial, and hence would occur, only if all of the firm's rivals behaved
similarly.6" Analogously, courts have sometimes premised findings
64. State v. SuperAmerica, 559 F. Supp. 298, 302 (D. Mont. 1983), citing Schoenkopf
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 1980).
65. State v. SuperAmerica, 559 F. Supp. 298, 302 (D. Mont. 1983); see also Levitch v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 697
F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[In order to support a finding of conspiracy as a result of
consciously parallel conduct, a plaintiff must present additional facts or circumstances
tending to show that the actions of the alleged co-conspirators were interdependent or
somehow concerted."). A
66. Blechman, supra note 29, at 885, 887.
67. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, supra note 53, at 371-82, is the best compen-
dium of plus factors available and I have relied on it extensively.
68. E.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (reversal of dismissal of complaint before discovery; service sta-
tion owners' class action challenging suppliers' requirement that each service station
carry one brand); Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 929 (1952) (affirmed judgment against major film distributors for refusal to
rent films to drive-in theatre); Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 1974
Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,991 (D. Ore. 1974) (summary judgment for manufacturers who
refused to sell cigarettes to plaintiff planning to market them under brand name "Can-
cer"); for additional cases relying on this factor, see Blechman, supra note 29, at 885-86
nn. 26-27; see also Note, Conscious Parallelism and the Sherman Act: An Analysis and a Proposal,
30 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1227, 1243-44 (1977) (asserting that action inconsistent with
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of conspiracy on parallel business decisions that are inconsistent
with how competitive firms should react to general market forces. 69
In American Tobacco, for example, the Court found that the defend-
ants' raising prices in the middle of the Depression was probative of
conspiracy.7y
Commentators have criticized use of this factor to show im-
proper agreement because not all interdependent behavior is neces-
sarily collusive. Interdependent conduct may be inconsistent with
each firm's self-interest when viewed individually, but be legal none-
theless. 7t For example, Areeda suggests that two sellers in adjacent
areas capable of selling into each other's territory, but which fail to
do so, might be either dividing the market by agreement or merely
behaving interdependently by avoiding reciprocal invasion of each
other's market.
72
Despite its lack of discriminative value, the "against self-inter-
est" factor can be useful in addressing a key question in conspiracy
cases: whether the trier of fact can reasonably infer a conspiracy
from all of the evidence. Thus, it can effectively screen out cases in
which agreement cannot be present. If none of the alleged conduct
is contrary to the firm's self-interest, the case probably should not
go to the jury. Moreover, conduct against self-interest that appears
"irrational" under any explanation other than conspiracy should be
prima facie evidence of collusion. If the defendants cannot persua-
sively explain their parallel conduct-perhaps by demonstrating that
their behavior was unilateral, though interdependent-it seems just
to allow a trier of fact to conclude that they were colluding. Thus,
once plaintiffs have shown that conduct was against self-interest, de-
fendants would have the burden of providing a plausible alternative
explanation. Use of this factor to shift the burden of proof is hardly
self-interest, plus conscious parallelism, should be prima facie evidence of a conspiracy
to monopolize in shared monopoly cases).
69. E.g., C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952); Bray v. Safeway Stores, 392 F. Supp. 851, case dismissed, 403
F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Cal. 1975); cf. Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363 (8th
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950) (no conspiracy where behavior is consistent
with market forces).
70. 328 U.S. at 805. But see R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 69 n.44, strongly criticizing
the Supreme Court's reasoning in American Tobacco.
71. Blechman, supra note 29, at 885, 897.
72. P. AREEDA, supra note 53, at 378. Areeda explains that the sellers may be re-
fraining "from selling in the other's territory in the hope that the other will refrain from
selling in his and with the realization that selling across the boundary by one would
almost surely invite a reciprocal invasion by the other." Id. Although some might label




onerous-defendants often make convincing arguments that they
were behaving independently even when they were not. Moreover,
merely shifting the burden would allow the courts to dispose of
more extreme cases efficiently.
(b) Motive for Concerted Action. -The existence of a motive for
concerted action is closely related to the "against self-interest" fac-
tor and some courts use the factors together as a two-pronged
test. 73 The motive factor, however, has also stood alone.7 4  Evi-
dence of a motive for concerted action is "critical . . . for in the
absence of a demonstration of how it would benefit a party to refuse
to deal, the requisite inference of conspiracy does not follow from a
mere coincidence of refusals to deal."-75 This plus factor requires
determining whether the firms involved had reason to act together.
In other words, would the parallel behavior benefit them?76 Like
the "against self-interest" factor, the motive factor has been
criticized for failing to distinguish cases in which parallel conduct
73. Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d
Cir. 1975); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp 1100, 1175
(E.D. Pa. 1981), aFd in part, rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 106 S. Ct.
1348 (1986).
74. E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1360-61
(1986) (absence of motive to enter into predatory pricing conspiracy held dispositive);
Ambook Enter. v. Time, Inc., 612 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914
(1980) (summary judgment for defendants; advertiser challenged media practice of giv-
ing advertising agencies a 15% discount); Reading Indus. v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,
477 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 631 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 916 (1981); Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295, 316
(N.D. Cal. 1971) ("In a highly concentrated, vertically integrated, interdependent indus-
try protected ... by enormous startup costs . . ., opportunities for collusion are exten-
sive and the potential benefits to be realized great. When there is . ..consciously
parallel conduct, as well as evidence of common motives for such conduct, strong infer-
ences of collusion are permissible."); United States v. FMC Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1106,
1143 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (inelastic demand implies strong collective interest to maintain
prices in face of excess supply); see also Blechman, supra note 29, at 886 n. 28.
75. Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1315 (3d
Cir. 1975) (affirming a grant ofjudgment n.o.v. to defendants in a case in which plain-
tiffs alleged a concerted refusal to deal); see also Continental Cablevision v. American
Elec. Power Co., 715 F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir. 1983) (defendant utility companies had
no reason to conspire because another party set their rates).
76. In the Ambook case, for example, the court pointed out that each advertising
agency had a strong, independent motive for maintaining a dual rate struture (each
agency received 15% discount from the media): their survival. Ambook Enter. v. Time,
Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 616 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980). The court
acknowledged that the media, another alleged conspirator, had no incentive to partici-
pate (the private antitrust action was filed by a member of the media) and noted that
there was ample evidence that the media was coerced into accepting the dual rate agree-
ment. Id. at 616-17.
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can be explained by interdependence alone from cases in which an
agreement has occurred.77 Because any degree of coordination will
generally raise prices and lower output, the relevant question is
whether such coordination was achieved-or could have been
achieved-without agreement.
(c) Other Evidence.-The pervasiveness of the claimed parallel
conduct is also relevant to a finding of conspiracy.78 Some courts
have regarded evidence of meetings among competitors prior to the
occurrence of parallel behavior, such as nearly simultaneous price
increases, as evidence of collusion. 79 In addition, facilitating prac-
tices such as delivered pricing and artificial product standardization,
which alone constitute enjoinable conduct, have also supported a
conspiracy finding.8 °
Moreover, courts have occasionally held past antitrust viola-
tions relevant to a later claim, but without explaining the precise
relevance of prior conduct.8 ' Posner agrees that "a 'record' of price
fixing or related antitrust violations is some evidence that the struc-
ture of the market is favorable to collusion."82 In Theatre Enterprises,
however, the Supreme Court refused to give weight to this factor
because the prior antitrust violations occurred under different
circumstances.8 3
Finally, courts have occasionally relied on poor economic per-
formance as a plus factor. For example, restriction of output,8 4 and
identical and nearly simultaneous price increases 5 have each been
cited for this purpose. 6 In addition, submission of identical sealed
77. P. AREEDA, supra note 53, at 375; see also Blechman, supra note 29, at 898-901
(general criticism of all plus factors).
78. Blechman, supra note 29, at 886 n. 30.
79. P. AREEDA, supra note 53, at 379-81 & 380 n.40.
80. E.g., C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). United States v. FMC Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1106, 1140 (E.D.
Pa. 1969); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 216 F. Supp. 250 (D. Minn. 1962), afdper
curiam, 382 U.S. 44 (1965). See also Clark, supra note 6.
81. P. AREEDA, supra note 53, at 374 n. 24; see, e.g., Norfolk Monument Co. v. Wood-
lawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700, 703 n.* (1969) (per curiam); C-O-Two Fire
Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 497 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892
(1952); Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 584 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
892 (1952); Ball v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 169 F.2d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1948).
82. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 61.
83. 346 U.S. at 541.
84. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 226 (7th Cir. 1978).
85. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 1958).
86. At least one commentator has proposed high profit margins as a plus factor.
Nye, Can Conduct Oriented Enforcement Inhibit Conscious Parallelism?, 44 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
LAWJ. 206, 220-21 (1975). The courts, however, have generally not used high profits as
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bids on a custom-made product has also been suggested as a plus
factor.87
3. Conclusion.-As noted above, commentators have criticized
the plus factors approach on the grounds that it does not in fact
distinguish instances of mere conscious parallelism from those in-
volving actual collusion with any precision. Moreover, the plus fac-
tors approach defines neither how many such factors are required,
nor the quantum of evidence regarding each factor that would be
sufficient to establish more than conscious parallelism. The most
probative plus factors appear to be conduct against self-interest and
use of facilitating practices, each of which might well support a find-
ing of agreement on their own. The weakest factors probably in-
clude past anticompetitive conduct and high profits. But even given
some convincing hierarchy of plus factors, the approach would still
be analytically imprecise and its results unpredictable.
Courts have never explicitly required evidence of direct com-
munication among the defendant firms as part of plus factor analy-
sis. Nevertheless, this author is aware of no instance in which a price
fixing agreement has been found without at least some direct evi-
dence of actual communication. Moreover, in only a few cases has
an agreement been inferred or implied with just minimal evidence
of direct communication. Proof of such communication may be a de
facto requirement; at the very least, it strengthens the case for liabil-
ity considerably.
For Posner, proof of direct communication is unnecessary if
supracompetitive performance is established through economic evi-
dence. As discussed earlier, Posner argues that coordinated behav-
ior among oligopolists is impossible absent agreement.
Consequently, once such behavior is established (by identifying a
evidence of conspiracy. United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 367 F. Supp. 91, 101 n. 14
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); cf. Estate of Le Baron v. Robin & Haas Co., 506 F.2d 1261, 1263 (9th
Cir. 1974) (refusal to admit evidence of above-average profit margins was within the trial
court's discretion). As a plus factor high profits have been criticized because of the diffi-
culty in determining that certain profits are "high" and the possibility that interdepen-
dent decisions, rather than collusion, have caused such high profits. P. AREEDA, supra
note 53, at 378-79; Breit & Elzinga, Information for Antitrust and Business Activity: Line-of-
Business Reporting, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970, at 115-18 (K. Clark-
son & T. Muris eds. 1980); Blechman, supra note 29, at 887 n.32, 898; Fisher & Mc-
Gowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AMER. ECON.
REV. 82 (March 1983). But see Long & Ravenscraft, The Misuse of Accounting Rates of Re-
turn: Comment, 74 AMER. ECON. REV. 494 (June 1984).
87. P. AREEDA, supra note 53, at 373-74 nn. 22-25. Areeda cites cases suggesting that
courts have been willing to infer conspiracy from "evidence implying that the alleged
conspirators expressly formulated a joint plan with each other." Id.
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market favorable to collusion, and then evaluating the market in
terms of his suggested factors), no further proof of agreement is
required. Despite this difference, however, Posner's approach is
consistent with the rule of conscious parallelism plus insofar as both
theories recognize the use of circumstantial economic evidence to
prove a conspiracy allegation.
Unfortunately, his analysis suffers from the same lack of preci-
sion and predictability that mars the plus factors approach. If virtu-
ally all of Posner's factors indicating collusion were present in an
industry,88 the inference of a conspiracy to fix prices would seem
incontrovertible. 9 It is unclear, however, how many of the factors
could be removed and still, in Posner's view, support a finding of
price fixing. Of course, much would depend on the quantity and
clarity of the evidence relevant to each factor.
Perhaps in response to criticism of the plus factors approach, a
number of courts have articulated a related, but more general test
for determining whether to infer an agreement. If the threshold re-
quirement of consciously parallel behavior is present, the test is
then whether the facts in the case "make the inference of rational
independent choice less attractive than that of concerted action." 90
This test may be as uncertain as the "plus factors" approach, but it
is a step away from the mechanical search for plus factors and
toward a more direct evaluation of the evidence.
88. See supra note 12, discussing Posner's list of factors.
89. There is precedent for enforcement action against industries which have struc-
tures less conducive to collusion and exhibit less performance evidence of collusion than
Posner contemplates, i.e. exchange of price information, e.g., United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), basing point pricing, e.g., FTC v. Cement Insti-
tute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), and identical bids, e.g., C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United
States, 197 F.2d 489, 494, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
90. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1086 (1978); accord Ambook Enter. v. Time, Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 615 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980) (Bogosian is "[a]s good a recent statement on the sub-
ject of conscious parallelism as any"); Weit v. Continential Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust
Co., 467 F. Supp. 197, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Federal Trade Commission v. Lukens Steel
Co., 454 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (D.D.C. 1978). See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1172-76 (E.D. Pa. 1981), affs'd in part, rev'd in
part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (excellent survey of the
law on inferring conspiracy from parallel conduct).
This approach is similar to that suggested by the Justice Department in its Amicus
Curiae Brief to the Supreme Court in Weyerhaueser Co. & Williamette Indus., Inc. v.
Lyman Lamb Co., 655 F.2d 627, 633 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1981) and Georgia-Pacific Corp.
v. Lyman Lamb Co., 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 3100 (1983)
(arguing that plaintiff's proof must "support a jury finding that the parallel conduct dif-
fered from the conduct to be expected if each firm acted in its own self interest as an
independent competitor .... ) Id. at 10.
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Posner's approach fits well into this more flexible framework.
Posner's basic point is that evidence of anticompetitive structure
and performance, like evidence of conduct, can support an infer-
ence of agreement. The newer test contemplates weighing evidence
of structure and performance, as well as conduct, to determine
whether "rational independent choice" is more likely than "con-
certed action," without imposing the strained conceptual notion of
so-called plus factors.
III. IN SEARCH OF AGREEMENTS
A review of particular cases in which the principles discussed
above have been applied confirms that courts currently seem unwill-
ing to embrace Posner's approach. A detailed examination of
caselaw also offers some tenative guidelines suggesting the circum-
stances under which courts are most likely to find collusion based on
evidence that falls short of proving the terms of an explicit agree-
ment. The cases can be divided into three categories according to
the type of analytical problem involved.
A. Express Agreements to Use Facilitating Practices
The "easiest" cases are those in which the presence of con-
certed action is undisputed. To impose liability, courts must simply
find a link between the concerted action and noncompetitive
performance.
The courts have often condemned agreements to use business
practices that restrain competition, including information-gathering
and dissemination programs,9' adherence to announced prices,92
91. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (reversal of dis-
missal of complaint against linseed oil manufacturers who hired information exchange
bureau to gather data from them about their sales, prices, and terms); American Column
& Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 409 (1921) (members of trade association
agreed to report their sales, shipments, production, inventory, prices, and other infor-
mation to the Association and in return received summaries and interpretations; court
held that "the purpose of the organization, and especially of the meetings, was to bring
about a concerted effort to raise prices regardless of cost or merit, and so was unlaw-
ful").
In two other information dissemination cases, the Court distinguished American Col-
umn and American Linseed Oil as involving competitively sensitive data. Cement Mfrs. Pro-
tective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (gathering and dissemination of
information shows no effect on price or production except as such would naturally occur
in the trade); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) (the lack
of any effect on prices a factor in finding no violation).
92. Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936) (agreements to limit discount-
ing and to maintain a delivered pricing system, limit quantity discounts, and eliminate
consignment points were an unreasonable restraint of trade).
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and basing point and other delivered pricing systems.93 Several
patterns run through these cases. First, each involved a trade asso-
ciation and, thus, regular meetings among its members. Hence,
resolving the issue of whether there was concerted action was rela-
tively easy. Nevertheless, the courts buttressed their findings of
concerted action by reciting the many detailed activities undertaken
to effectuate the delivered pricing or data dissemination scheme.
These recitations suggest a judicial need to establish a sort of mens
rea to distinguish the defendants' activities from legitimate trade as-
sociation activities. As one court pointed out, "it is difficult to dis-
cern how the various steps necessary to produce the result [of
uniform delivered prices] could have been taken with such meticu-
lous care and regularity in the absence of an agreement."94
Second, the activities at issue in each case were facilitating prac-
tices: they did not set prices directly, but rather helped maintain
price uniformity. Viewed in isolation, the individual practices them-
selves often appeared quite innocent. For example, the use of uni-
form freight rate books "standing alone may not mean much, if
anything, but when used in the manner disclosed, it is a reasonable
inference that they were part of the plan. . . ."' It was the overall
pattern of conduct, in addition to the fact that particular acts were
done in concert with other firms, that the court found significant.
Third, in every case in which a violation was found, the court
concluded both that prices were uniform and that the challenged
practices had an anticompetitive effect. By contrast, in the two early
cases in which it did not impose liability, the Supreme Court found
93. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 710 (1948) (to maintain collusive system,
companies concertedly engaged in "boycotts; ... organized opposition to the erection
of new cement plants; selling cement in a recalcitrant price cutter's sales territory at a
price so low that the recalcitrant was forced to adhere to the established basing point
prices; ... and preparing and distributing freight rate books .. "); Allied Paper Mills v.
FTC, 168 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949); Triangle Conduit &
Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), afd by an equally divided court sub noai.
Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949); Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC,
152 F.2d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 1946) (defendants also standardized their products, ex-
changed details of sales, and agreed to discounts and other terms and conditions of
sales); United States Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1945) (practices also
included a statistical reporting system, industry meetings, and a system whereby all price
changes were immediately transmitted to all members); see generally Note, Conscious Paral-
lelism in the Use of Delivered Price Syslems: A M1Iodified Per Se Standard of Review Under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 66 CORNEi. L. REV. 1194 (1981) (analysis of three standards
of review for determining the legality of conscious parallelism in the use of delivered
pricing systems).
94. United States Maltsters Ass'n v. FTC, 152 F.2d 161, 165 (7th Cir. 1945).
95. Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946).
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no effect on prices. 96 However, the strength of the link between the
practices and the result alleged has varied considerably. In Sugar
Institute v. United States, for example, the court below found a direct
link between the agreement to adhere to announced prices and the
anticompetitive effect, 97 and the Supreme Court concurred. 98 In
Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, on the other hand, the
Court pointed out that price uniformity and uniform delivered pric-
ing had been "coincident" for many years, and that "[t]housands of
secret sealed bids" turned out to be identical "down to a fractional
part of a penny," thus merely implying that the basing point system
promoted uniformity.99
Fourth, in each case the court found grounds to reject the de-
fendants' assertion that natural market forces gave rise to price uni-
formity. In Cement Institute, for example, the Court held that the
Commission was authorized to ignore testimony by the respon-
dents' economic experts that "competition alone could lead to the
evolution of a multiple basing point system."' 0 0 The Court stated
that this view "[c]ertainly .. .runs counter to what many people
have believed, namely, that without agreement, prices will vary-
that the desire to sell will sometimes be so strong that a seller will be
willing to lower his prices and take his chances."' 0 ' Moreover, in
Sugar Institute the Court pointed out that "because sugar is a stan-
dardized commodity, there is a strong tendency to uniformity of
price," and therefore it is even "more important that such opportu-
nities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired."' 2
B. Inferred Express Agreements to Restrain Competition
When firms do not openly act in concert, as in trade associa-
tions, proving the existence of an agreement to restrain competition
is more difficult. This section considers "inferred agreement"
cases-those involving allegations of secret express agreements in
which the courts have considered whether to infer an agreement
from evidence of conduct and performance. In cases of this type the
96. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 605 (1925); Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-85 (1925).
97. 297 U.S. 553, 583 (1936).
98. Id. at 589.
99. 333 U.S. 683, 713 (1948).
100. Id. at 715; cf. Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. at 636-37, where the Commission rejected
the respondents' expert testimony that delivered pricing did not contribute to price-
matching because prices could be matched without it.
101. 333 U.S. at 716.
102. 297 U.S. at 600.
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plaintiff must prove more than just an unreasonable effect on com-
petition; it must also prove the existence of both a common
scheme-that is, an agreement-and a link between the agreement
and poor performance. The cases discussed in this section are more
recent than the trade association cases, perhaps because enforce-
ment action against trade associations has driven anticompetitive ac-
tivities "underground." Each of these cases involved direct
evidence of direct interfirm communication as well as at least some
analysis of the structure and performance of the market.
In C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. United States, the Eighth Circuit
affirmed criminal price-fixing convictions of four fire extinguisher
producers. 0 3 Circumstantial evidence suggesting the existence of
an agreement included meetings among the defendants (although
there was no direct evidence of what transpired at the meetings),
"standardization of a product that is not naturally standardized," 104
industry-wide resale price maintenance, identical sealed bids from
all four companies on at least two occasions, an attempt by one firm
to withdraw a mistaken bid that was slightly lower than those of its
rivals, uniform delivered pricing, and price increases despite a sur-
plus of extinguishers on the market.
In Morton Salt Co. v. United States, the government indicted four
of the six firms that together controlled ninety-five percent of salt
sales in a regional market.'0 5 The firms had exchanged "all the de-
tails of a fairly complicated pricing system."' 0 6 In upholding their
conviction in the district court, the Tenth Circuit observed that the
market was oligopolistic, and thus
it is almost inevitable that the pricing policies of one com-
pany will be influenced and to some extent dictated by
knowledge of probable countervailing action by its compe-
tition. And this perhaps detracts from the weight we
should give to parallel pricing. But the presence of only a
few friendly sellers and the stable demand for the product
present a great opportunity and temptation to combine to
maintain prices at an artificially high level profitable to
all. 107
The court found "compelling" structural and performance evidence
103. 197 F.2d 489, 495 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
104. Id. at 493.
105. 235 F.2d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 1956).




that the case "present[ed] more than an example of conscious paral-
lel business behavior."'' 0 8 Although the court also discussed other
evidence-including one firm's refusal to sell ice for resale because
the customer was underselling the firms' competitors' 09-the clear
implication of the opinion is that the oligopolistic structure of the
market, the exchange of pricing data, and price uniformity were
enough to sustain the conviction.
A third case of the same genre is United States v. FMC Corp., a
civil action in which FMC was charged with conspiring to fix the
prices of chlorine, soda ash, and caustic soda and to stabilize the
price of caustic soda." 0 FMC's competitors, the eight other chlor-
alkali producers, had each consented to an injunction."' In a care-
ful analysis of the industry's structure, conduct, and performance,
Judge Higginbotham exonerated FMC on the price-fixing count but
found it liable on the price stablization count.
Higginbotham found "credible evidence" that factors other
than agreement were sufficient to explain the uniformity of list
prices and other signs of noncompetitive performance." 2 This evi-
dence included the homogeneity of and inelastic demand for the
products, the presence of large quantity buyers in the market, and
the existence of long-term contracts containing meet or release
clauses. These market factors dictated price uniformity because,
under such conditions, no firm could sell its product at a price
higher than that of its competitors. The meet or release clauses, in
particular, discouraged discounting by giving buyers an incentive to
report any offers to sell at a lower price back to their suppliers, who
then had an opportunity to match the competitor's price.
The court conceded that the government might have been cor-
rect in contending that "gatherings and discussions allowed [the
firms] to predict the reactions and responses of their competitors to
any prospective price increase." However, the court concluded,
"[T]his merely proves that possible competitor reaction was another
economic reality which each producer had to consider in addition to
108. Id.
109. Id. at 577-78.
110. 306 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
111. Id. at 1108-09. Whether Higginbotham was influenced by the existence of tie
consent agreements that the Justice Department had obtained from the other producers
is unclear. While, of course, legally they should have had no effect, psychologically they
might have compelled Higginbotham to find at least some liability. I find it surprising, in
fact, that he did not find liability on the price-fixing count.
112. For example, the government noted that all producers announced price in-
creases at approximately the same time. Id. at 1139.
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costs and profit margins, in determining the feasibility of a price
increase."' 13
In sharp contrast to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Morton Salt,
Higginbotham permitted FMC to offer market structure as a justifi-
cation for the industry's poor performance. While the Tenth Circuit
had been leery of any practice that might encourage noncompetitive
performance precisely because the industry structure was conducive
to collusion, Higginbotham apparently viewed the meet or release
clauses, in particular, as a structural factor" 4 rather than as an en-
joinable facilitating practice.' 15 Had he viewed use of the clauses as
a voluntary decision by the firms, rather than as a preordained fix-
ture of the industry structure, however, he might well have found
the firm's parallel practice sufficient to support a finding of liability
on the price-fixing count. On the basis of similar reasoning about
market conditions, Higginbotham also condoned the meetings
among FMC and its competitors, even though he apparently con-
ceded that the meetings were enjoinable conduct that enhanced the
firms' ability to coordinate that pricing.
Although Higginbotham found no agreement to raise prices, he
did find an agreement to stabilize the price of caustic soda-thereby
preventing its decline from the level it had reached as a result of
market forces-by exchanging information. Higginbotham brushed
aside suggestions that the defendants were merely gathering market
intelligence, pointing out that the "meetings and exchange of infor-
mation.., occurred only when necessary to impart information con-
cerning departures from the established list price of caustic soda or
disparities in quoting freight rates which portended industry-wide
repercussions if not controlled in their impact."' 16 The inference of
conspiracy was further strengthened by the firms' efforts to maintain
uniform freight arrangements. These efforts included exchanging
information, agreeing not to recognize Linden, New Jersey, as an
113. Id. at 1143; cf. Turner, supra note 25, at 665.
114. He discussed the clauses under the heading of "The Products and the Basic
Characteristics of the Chlor-Alkali Industry." 306 F. Supp. at 1110-12. A "meet or re-
lease" clause promises that the seller will match an offer of a lower price or release the
buyer from the contract. See Clark, suipra note 6, at 934.
115. The Federal Trade Commission viewed the "most favorable nations" clauses as
an enjoinable facilitating practice in Ethl Coip.
116. 306 F. Supp. 1146; see also Greenhaw v. Iubbock County Beverage Ass'n, 721
F.2d 1019, 1030-31 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 726 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1984) (evidence
supported jury finding that "defendants actively engaged in exchanging price informia-
tion and negotiating the prices to be charged by liquor retailers").
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equalization (basing) point, and agreeing on a common definition of
quantities of caustic soda qualifying for shipment by barge.
The court's unwillingness to sustain the price-fixing charge in
this case illustrates a fundamental problem in attempting to use eco-
nomic evidence alone to prove collusion, as Posner suggests. If a
court finds the economic evidence ambiguous, it will generally ex-
onerate the defendants-yet the evidence is almost always
ambiguous.
Perhaps the most direct application of the Posner approach oc-
curred in connection with a suit in which the State of Oklahoma was
awarded $4.6 million in damages from local asphalt producers that
had allegedly fixed prices on state contracts." i7 The State's econo-
mist relied on the presence of an industry structure conducive to
collusion to conclude that a price-fixing and market division con-
spiracy existed. 18 In particular, bids to the Oklahoma Highway De-
partment were identical at over 10 cents per gallon, while bids to
other states averaged only 6 cents per gallon and were far more dis-
persed. Although the State proved that the defendants met to-
gether through a trade association just before each contract award
and began submitting identical bids just after forming the associa-
tion, it apparently did not prove that prices were discussed. The
true significance of the case, however, is that it focused on evidence
of noncompetitive performance rather than on enjoinable conduct,
although proof of trade association meetings was available to rebut
the defendants' claim that they were only pricing interdependently.
As these cases illustrate, courts will sometimes infer an agree-
ment to fix prices when concerted action has an effect on price. An
ironclad causal link between the objectionable conduct and poor
performance, showing that but for that conduct there would be
competitive performance, does not appear to be necessary; rather,
the unexplained coincidence of concerted conduct and poor perform-
ance seems to suffice. Poor performance indicates, at a minimum,
an industry structure lacking in price competition and prices that are
117. The case, Oklahoma v. Allied Materials Corp., which was tried in the federal
district court for the Western District of Oklahoma in 1965, was not reported but is
discussed in Funderburk, Price Fixing in the Liquid-Asphalt Industry: Economic Analvsis Versus
the "Hot Document", 7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 61 (1974).
118. The industry exhibited many of the structural factors identified by Kuhlman and
Erickson as facilitating collusion: The industry was concentrated, with a strong trade
association and high entry barriers; asphalt is a homogeneous product with an inelastic
demand; and sales were made on the basis of sealed bids to public bodies. Kuhlman,
Nature and Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 69 (1969); Erick-
son, Economics of Price Fixing, 2 ANTITRUST L. & EcON. REV. 82 (1969).
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supracompetitive. The courts generally have not attempted to de-
fine a hypothetical competitive price and compare it to the market
price to show that the market price is collusive. Instead, they have
looked to factors such as industry overcapacity, as in FMC, which
suggest that prices should be lower than they are. In each case, a
significant factor seems to have been the lack of a credible innocent
explanation for the pattern of conduct and performance. Indeed,
the defendants' ability to present a credible nonconspiratorial expla-
nation for the industry's poor performance is an important determi-
nant of the overall strength of a case. It is possible that liability
would be imposed when alternative explanations are lacking, even
without direct proof of enjoinable conduct. Like proof of enjoinable
conduct, lack of an innocent explanation is demonstrative of the
mens rea apparently necessary for the courts to find price fixing on
the basis of economic evidence. Nevertheless, FMC serves as a re-
minder that economic evidence must be unambiguous. Courts will
not impose severe sanctions absent compelling proof of guilt. By
requiring such certainty, however, the courts may demand more of
economic analysis than it can deliver.
C. Implicit Agreements to Restrain Competition
This section analyzes cases involving implicit agreements.
Courts have occasionally been willing to find that agreement is im-
plied by the conduct of parties. The inferred agreements discussed
above are premised on a finding that some direct, albeit unknown,
communication among defendants must have existed because the
industry's pattern of structure, conduct, or performance would not
otherwise have occurred. By contrast, the implicit agreements dis-
cussed here assume that the court knows about all of the firms' con-
duct and finds that this conduct standing alone constitutes an
agreement. Although this theory has been tested only a few times,
courts and commentators have found commitment to be the essen-
tial element of a Sherman Act agreement. To define the type of
concerted action prohibited by the Sherman Act, the Supreme
Court recently adopted the language used by the Third Circuit in
EdwardJ. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc. ,1 19 that such conduct involves
a "conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve
an unlawful objective."'120
119. 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
120. Id. at 111; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764
(1984). Monsanto was a vertical case, but other courts have articulated very similar for-
mulations in horizontal cases. E.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884, 890
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Similarly, commentator Michael Blechman defines "agree-
ment" to include "a sense of commitment in the minds of the agree-
ing parties" and "some assurance as to what the other agreeing
parties are going to be doing in the future."'' Under this defini-
tion, "agreement" appears to be a legal conclusion that the firms
involved intended anticompetitive behavior although intent is proved
circumstantially. 22 The Second Circuit apparently had a similar no-
tion in vacating the Commission's Ethyl Corp. decision:
[B]efore business conduct in an oligopolistic industry may
be labeled "unfair" within the meaning of § 5 a minimum
standard demands that, absent a tacit agreement, at least
some indicia of oppressiveness must exist such as (1) evi-
dence of anticompetitive intent or purpose on the part of
the producer charged, or (2) the absence of an independ-
ent legitimate business reason . . . for its conduct.' 2 1
While the Second Circuit's description is dicta because the court
held that the facts failed to show an agreement, it appears to estab-
lish a standard similar to Blechman's.
These definitions seem to suggest, again, that when faced with
an ambiguous pattern of parallel behavior a court should look for
something showing a mens rea, or anticompetitive intent, on the part
of the firms.'1 4 While such intent is not a formal requirement for
establishing liability, courts and commentators seem to use it to
(7th Cir. 1963) (conspiracy finding requires a "consciousness of commitment to a com-
mon scheme"); United States v. General Motors Corp., 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75,253, at 97,670 (E.D. Mich. 1974) ("[U]nless a defendant understands from some-
thing said or done that it is committed to the other defendants to raise prices, it cannot
be a conspirator.").
121. Blechman, supra note 29, at 895, 896 (footnote omitted). With regard to com-
mitment, a refusal to discount "indicates the sort of restricted freedom of action and
sense of obligation that one generally associates with agreement." Id. at 899. Assur-
ance, on the other hand, may be shown by subjective evidence that the defendant en-
joyed the "knowledge and confidence concerning its competitor's actions which an
agreement would suggest" or by evidence showing communication of assurance among
competitors, such as use of price protection clauses that impose penalties for discount-
ing. Id. at 900. Pure conscious parallelism does not involve commitment or assurance:
[A] business . . . may take some action based on what it calculates, expects or
fears will be the reactions of its competitors; but it is not likely to feel commit-
ted or obligated to act in a given way. Similarly, such a firm may expect or hope
that its competitors will behave in a particular manner; but it is not likely to
have any assurance that they will do so.
Id. at 897.
122. Id. at 902.
123. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).
124. As discussed above, the courts appear to be searching for similar evidence in the
trade association and inferred agreement cases.
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show that the defendant has not been innocently captured in a web
of circumstantial evidence.
2 5
Cases illustrating the type of commitment necessary to establish
an implicit agreement include three key Supreme Court decisions.
In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,126 the Court found that the
defendants' conduct-even absent direct communication regarding
price or other business decisions-established enough commitment
to find an agreement. The manager of Interstate Circuit, a major
Texas film exhibitor, had written to each of the local managers of
the eight distributor defendants, listing each as an addressee, and
requesting that they not permit their first run films to be exhibited
for less than a 40 cents admission or as part of a double feature.
27
Following meetings between the Interstate manager and each dis-
tributor individually, all distributors substantially complied with In-
terstate's demands. After affirming an injunction prohibiting movie
exhibitors and distributors from restraining trade, the Court stated,
in dictum, that the district court finding of agreement
was not a prerequisite to an unlawful conspiracy. It was
enough that, knowing the concerted action was contem-
plated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to
the scheme and participated in it. Each distributor was ad-
vised that the others were asked to participate; each knew
that cooperation was essential to the successful operation
of the plan. They knew that the plan, if carried out, would
result in a restraint of commerce....
This dictum is puzzling because the facts that the Court said could
have supported a conclusion of conspiracy without a finding of
agreement-knowing, interdependent, and parallel conduct that re-
strained commerce-are essentially the same facts that supported
the district court's finding of agreement. The Court unfortunately
did not explain the difference between agreement and unlawful con-
certed activity short of agreement. Its language seems to suggest
that the type of concerted action prohibited by the Sherman Act can
125. The Second Circuit suggested in Ethyl Corp. that "conduct contrary to [a firm's]
independent self interest" would have shown the necessary illegal intent. Id. at 140.
While Blechman concludes that the "plus factors" are only useful for determining
whether the two elements (commitment and assurance) of an agreement are present,
and are not directly probative of an agreement, he probably would agree that the against
self-interest plus factor is strong evidence of agreement. Blechman, supra note 29, at
898-901.
126. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
127. Id. at 217.
128. Id. at 226.
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be found either by inferring the existence of a secret agreement or
by finding it implicit in known conduct that falls short of express
agreement.
Three years later, in 1942, the Court invoked the dictum of In-
terstate Circuit in United States v. Masonite Corp., when it pointed out
that "[t]he fixing of prices by one member of a group pursuant to
express delegation, acquiescence, or understanding is just as illegal
as the fixing of prices by direct, joint action."' 129 Masonite Corp. and
Interstate Circuit thus stand for the proposition that avoidable, inter-
dependent conduct that has an anticompetitive effect may be the ba-
sis for finding an implied agreement. 3 ' They resemble the trade
association cases' 3 ' in that the conduct was visible and the problem
was in deciding whether the conduct added up to a horizontal agree-
ment to restrain commerce. Unlike the trade association cases, how-
ever, in Interstate Circuit and Masonite the Court had to decide both
that the conduct was concerted and that it had an anticompetitive
effect.
The third major Supreme Court decision in this category,
United States v. Container Corp. of America,' 32 provides an interesting
contrast to the FMC Corp. case.' 33  Both involved fairly concentrated
129. 316 U.S. 265, 275-76 (1942) (reversing the district court's dismissal of the com-
plaint). In Masonite Corp., the government challenged a series of identical agreements
between Masonite, a manufacturer of hardboard and holder of patents covering the pro-
duction of hardboard, and other manufacturers and sellers of hardboard. The agree-
ments allowed Masonite to set minimum prices and other terms of sale and contained
other restrictions, e.g., on classes of customers served. Masonite sent each of the com-
panies copies of all of the other agreements. Although its language is ambiguous, the
Court did not appear to base its decision on the individual agreements between Mason-
ite and each of its competitors but rather on the pattern of contracts.
130. The two cases apparently encouraged the decision in Milgram v. Loew's, Inc.,
192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 929 (1952), a case in which a group of
movie distributors refused to deal with a drive-in movie theatre. The Third Circuit up-
held a district court finding that the distributors had acted in concert in refusing to rent
their pictures to the drive-in until 28 days after their first run despite the testimony of
the distributors "that each proceeded in ignorance of the others," - testimony that
"was termed by the district judge incredible." 192 F.2d at 582-83. The court based its
finding on the defendant's consciously parallel refusal to rent "in apparent contradiction
to its own self interest" since the distributors refused higher rentals from the drive-in.
Id. at 583. It also found the distributors' business justifications unconvincing, being
"based on mere conjecture, for none had ever experimented in licensing features on
first run to drive-in." Id. at 585.
131. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
132. 393 U.S. 333 (1968).
133. For a discussion of FM4C Corp., see supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
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industries producing homogeneous products for which there was in-
elastic demand. Price was the key competitive factor. As Judge Hig-
ginbotham pointed out when comparing the two cases in FMC Corp.,
the nature of the information exchanges among defendants was
somewhat different: "While there were not the frequent recurring
communications between competitors in this [FMC] case as charac-
terized the Container case, the difference can be attributed to the dif-
ference in marketing. However in both cases the information was
exchanged 'when necessary' and with a purpose and effect to stabi-
lize the market."' 4 A more significant distinction is the lack of any
evidence in Container Corp. of communication among the firms re-
garding a plan to exchange price information; the price disclosures
apparently developed spontaneously. The Supreme Court never-
theless found an agreement:
Each defendant on receiving that request [for price infor-
mation] usually furnished the data with the expectation
that it would be furnished reciprocal information when it
wanted it. Such concerted action is of course sufficient to
establish conspiracy, the initial ingredient of a violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act." 5
In addition, the Court found that "[t]he exchange of price informa-
tion seemed to have the effect of keeping prices within a fairly nar-
row ambit" and "stabilize[d] prices though at a downward level."' 36
Justice Marshall agreed that the firms' conduct demonstrated an
agreement to exchange price information, but dissented from the
Court's holding because he felt the evidence of anticompetitive ef-
fect was too weak. Marshall pointed out that demand was increasing,
entry was easy, and there was substantial fringe and active price
competition.' 3 7 Comparison of the two interpretations highlights,
once again, the ambiguity and complexity of most economic
evidence.
Despite precedent confirming that agreement can be implicit in
134. 306 F. Supp. at 1147.
135. 393 U.S. at 335.
136. Id. at 336; cf. Greenhaw v. Lubbock County Beverage Ass'n, 721 F.2d 1019, 1031
(5th Cir. 1983), reh g denied, 726 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1984) (price exchange supports jury
finding of conspiracy); Vermont Int'l Petroleum Co. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 492 F.
Supp. 429 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (evidence of extensive interfirm communication established
conspiracy).
137. 393 U.S. at 340-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall was joined by Justices
Harlan and Stewart. See also Continental Cablevision v. American Elec. Power Co., 715
F.2d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir. 1983) (exchange of price information legal absent anticompe-
titive purpose of result).
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conduct that shows the requisite degree of commitment, there is an
ongoing judicial reluctance to find an agreement absent some direct
evidence of interfirm communication. The Supreme Court's dictum
in Theatre Enterprises stating that conscious parallelism had not read
conspiracy out of the Sherman Act exemplified this reluctance in
1954. 138 Plaintiffs today must still address the judicial need for clear
proof of anticompetitive intent. In Wilcox DevelopmeAt Co. v. First In-
terstate Bank, for example, a district court recently granted a judg-
ment n.o.v. to the defendant bank despite a jury finding that it had
conspired to fix the level of interest rates. 39 The plaintiffs argued
that the bank's "count to four" method of setting its prime rate-
the rate changed when four of seven specified western banks
changed theirs-was analogous to the exchange of price informa-
tion in Container Corp. and was suspect because it did not relate the
rate to the bank's cost of funds. The plaintiffs also argued that trade
association meetings were a "plus factor" indicating a conspiracy.
The court correctly rejected these arguments, distinguishing
Container Corp. because it involved information unavailable from
public sources. Moreover, the court noted "[t]here was ample testi-
mony from all expert witnesses at trial that defendants' 'prime rate'
is a national prime rate imposed by national economic condi-
tions.' 40 The court found that the bank had instituted the "count
to four" method unilaterally and that the method merely reflected
the adjustment of interest rates nationally.14' Because the bank was
forced to respond to "national economic conditions," as reflected in
rate changes by other banks, the court discounted the trade associa-
tion meetings as a plus factor: "One wonders why a discussion,
agreement or conspiracy would be necessary .... Given the com-
petitive realities which apply, it would be of no real point to agree to
that which they had been doing and felt compelled to continue to
do."' 14 2 In short, the court found that the bank's conduct showed a
joint commitment merely to respond to market conditions. This
case demonstrates, again, that because of the inherent ambiguity of
economic evidence and the existence of alternative explanations for
coordinated behavior, the same practice can be interpreted as either
a voluntary decision or an externally imposed market fixture.
138. See supra text accompanying note 61.
139. 605 F. Supp. 592 (D. Or. 1985).
140. Id. at 595.
141. Id. at 596. The smaller Western banks followed the lead of the large Western




The recent case of Ambook Enterprises v. Time, Inc. did not involve
an oligopoly market, but merits discussion here because it demon-
strates a willingness to consider the possibility of implied agreement
even absent direct evidence of improper communication. 43 An ad-
vertiser accused advertising agencies of maintaining a dual rate
structure under which the media charged advertisers using an ad-
vertising agency fifteen percent less on their advertising purchases
and gave the fifteen percent discount to the agency as a commis-
sion. 144 All other advertisers paid the full rate. Although a trade
association existed and the industry had settled an earlier govern-
ment allegation of collusion, implicit agreement, not proof of com-
munication among the defendants, was the thrust of the suit.
The Second Circuit held that the district court improperly
granted summary judgment to the defendants, citing Interstate Circuit
as controlling.'4 5 Its decision was based on the lack of explanation
by the defendants for the dual rate structure, the motive of the
agencies for maintaining that structure, and evidence that the agen-
cies had coerced the media into setting the dual rates. Moreover,
the court rejected the suggestion that the uniformity of this practice
could be explained by the structure of the market: "The very
number of competitors, among both the media and the agencies,
argues against the claim that any price movement, however limited,
would be immediately followed by everyone, so that its originator
would derive no benefits."' 4 6 Thus, "a jury could have concluded
... that the conscious parallelism of the dual rate system was not the
result of hundreds of unanimous individual decisions but rather was
an agreement .... 147
The opinion does not clearly distinguish whether the court be-
lieved that ajury could have inferred that the agencies had created a
secret agreement, or whether a jury could have found an agreement
implicit in the observable conduct. That the case involved so many
firms, however, suggests that the court was holding that the evi-
dence could support a finding of implicit agreement.
General Electric (GE) and Westinghouse engaged in similar,
143. 612 F.2d 604, 616 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980). This case is
weak precedent for implicit agreement cases because of its procedural posture: the Sec-
ond Circuit merely held that the case could go to trial. Id. at 620.
144. A few large advertisers (those with "sufficient muscle") also received the dis-
count on the theory that they had in-house advertising agencies. Id. at 611.
145. Id. at 613-14.
146. Id. at 615.
147. Id. at 618.
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but far more clearly egregious conduct with regard to turbine gener-
ator pricing. After the government caught them fixing prices, the
companies agreed in 1962, that they would not "[e]xchange infor-
mation regarding prices, pricing methods or other terms and condi-
tions of sale .... 4 In 1963, however, GE announced a simplified
pricing system based on use of a price book and a published multi-
plier that applied to the book prices. Moreover, GE's sales contracts
contained a price protection clause which provided that if GE low-
ered prices to one customer, every buyer within the preceding six-
month period would receive the same price. The clause in effect
discouraged discounting. Westinghouse instituted essentially the
same system. 1
49
To forestall aJustice Department suit alleging that "these prac-
tices allowed GE and Westinghouse to avoid price competition with-
out the need for formal collusion," ' 5° the companies agreed to
modifications of the earlier consent orders.' 5 ' Despite the absence
of evidence indicating direct communication between the two firms,
the Department believed that the companies' "public exchange of
assurances ... did constitute an agreement to stabilize prices which
warranted the filing of a civil action . . .alleging a violation of the
Sherman Act .... 52 In deciding to impose modifications of the
original consent order, the Department rejected the companies' ar-
gument that their identical price levels had resulted from either
mere conscious parallelism or price leadership by GE. 15 1 Rather,
the Department concluded:
The complexity of the product and the secretive and
uncertain nature of the bidding process made it necessary
for GE to go beyond the simple announcement of an inten-
tion to discontinue discounting if Westinghouse were to
148. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,503, at 77,044
(E.D.Pa. 1962) (consent decree); see also United States v. General Elec. Co., 1962 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 70,488 (E.D. Pa.1962) (similar consent decree covering other types of
electric equipment).
149. Hay, supra note 3, at 473; Department of Justice Notice regarding United States
v. General Elec. Co. & Westinghouse Elec. Co., 42 Fed. Reg. 17004-10 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as DOJ Notice].
150. Hay, supra note 3, at 474. By "formal collusion," Hay seems to mean an express
agreement.
151. The modified orders required each firm to develop a new pricing system and to
keep it confidential, and contained other provisions designed to introduce uncertainty
into pricing. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,659-
661, 72,721 (E.D. Pa. 1977); see also 61,659-660.
152. DOJ Notice, supra note 148, 42 Fed. Reg. at 17,006; see Hay, supra note 3, at 474.
153. DOJ Notice, supra note 148, 42 Fed. Reg. at 17007.
1986] 425
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
have information concerning and confidence in GE's inten-
tions to follow ....
Westinghouse's activities went beyond mere passive
following of GE's lead.1
54
Hence, to the justice Department, at least, the companies' avoidable
conduct demonstrated the commitment necessary to justify finding
an implicit agreement.
An implied agreement was also found in Wall Products Co. v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co.1 55 The pivitol factor in that case was the announce-
ment by each firm, within days of its competitors, that it was
withdrawing discounts from all customers.1 56 The firms stopped
competing with single plant (fringe) firms and exchanged extensive
price information among themselves as well. 157 Moreover, each
firm centralized its pricing authority in its chief executive.' 58 Fur-
ther evidence of collusion included infrequent price changes (due to
the refusal to discount); a decline in the sales of the leading firms
during the first year of the alleged cartel, despite their excess capac-
ity; and a decline in their market shares during the period in which
the alleged conspiracy occurred.1 59
While the firms regularly verified prices, direct interfirm com-
munication was not a significant factor in finding an illegal agree-
ment. Addressing circumstantial evidence of advance
communication about pricing policy changes, the court declared
that
failure to establish such advance notice is not fatal to plain-
tiffs' claim that defendants were actively participating in an
agreement or conspiracy to fix or stabilize prices. In an in-
dustry composed of few sellers of a homogeneous product,
154. Id.
155. 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
156. The structure of the industry was conducive to collusion. For example, seller
concentration was high, the product was standard, and demand was inelastic. Id. at 300-
05. The court subsequently awarded treble damages of approximately $3 million. 357
F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
157. The court specifically found this practice legal as necessary to avoid Robinson-
Patman Act violations. 326 F. Supp. at 312-15. But cf. United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 422 (1978).
158. Cf Morton Salt, 235 F.2d at 578 (requirement that sales manager of firm clear
bids with general manager because of sales manager's past proclivity to cut prices held
probative of firm's involvement in conspiracy).
159. The court also compared profit levels against a benchmark (profit levels on all
manufacturing companies) and found them to be less than the benchmark. 326 F. Supp.
at 303-04. The benchmark used was too broad for a valid comparison, and the court
accordingly drew no conclusions regarding the implication of profitability level.
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when the major competitive sellers engage in policies and
practices which have for their objective the stopping of de-
clining prices and deviations from terms of sale and when
those policies and practices are parallel in detail (even as to
unannounced policies and practices) and are so interde-
pendent that adherence thereto on the part of all such ma-
jor competitors is essential to the achievement of their
objective, such interdependent conscious parallel action
may well constitute a tacit understanding .... 60
The court further reasoned that
a review of the course of conduct of the defendants reflects
such "interdependent conscious parallelism" in their poli-
cies and practices (announced and unannounced) as to
compel the conclusion that the defendants were engaged in
a tacit understanding by "acquiescence coupled with assist-
ance" to fix and stablize the prices of gypsum wallboard. 16 1
In United States v. General Motors Corp. 162 however, the simulta-
neous withdrawal of discounts did not support a finding of implied
agreement. In that case, the Justice Department brought parallel
criminal and civil actions alleging that General Motors (GM) and
Ford Motor Co. had fixed prices in the automotive fleet market
(purchases by governments and rental car and taxicab companies)
through the use of two devices. First, the companies allegedly
"used third parties as 'conduits' for the purpose of exchanging mu-
tual assurances that each would eliminate or substantially reduce
fleet price concessions if the other did." 6 ' Second, they allegedly
signalled their intentions through public statements by their
executives.
The district court found for the companies in the civil case,'
holding that the evidence was insufficient to show that the compa-
nies had agreed to eliminate the discounts or that they had acted
contrary to rational business behavior. In fact, the court rejected
the contention that the companies' conduct was parallel.' 6 5 In par-
ticular, the court found that the deteriorating economy had caused
the companies to seek ways of increasing profits independently and
that withdrawal of discounts was one method of doing so. Although
160. Id. at 316 (emphasis in original).
161. Id.
162. 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,253 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
163. Id.
164. A jury had earlier returned a verdict of not guilty in the criminal trial. Id. at
97,657.
165. Id. at 97,671.
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the companies' mutual withdrawal of discounts may have been inter-
dependent, the court did not believe that the companies had suffi-
ciently committed themselves to this conduct to have reached an
agreement. The result suggests judicial uneasiness with the notion
of implied agreement.
The cases in which implicit agreements have been found share
several characteristics.' 66 First, although they all involved some di-
rect evidence of interfirm communication, there was either no direct
evidence that the communication involved prices or, when there was
direct evidence of price communication, it apparently did not signif-
icantly influence the court's holding. Rather, judicial analysis in
these cases focused on economic evidence. Wall Products, in particu-
lar, appears to be precisely the type of decision that Posner envi-
sions. 1 6 7 Nevertheless, this author is aware of no case in which an
implied agreement has been found without some evidence of direct
communication. While the GE case might have been an exception
had it gone to trial, it seems likely that a case involving no evidence
of direct communication would be very difficult for a plaintiff to win.
Second, the cases all involved enjoinable conduct, such as the
price book and price protection clauses in GE and the price an-
nouncements in Wall Products. This pattern suggests that enjoinable
conduct may be necessary to support a finding of agreement.1 68 As
discussed above, courts seem to rely on the existence of such con-
duct to distinguish collusive behavior from that which is merely in-
terdependent. Evidence of enjoinable conduct serves as a kind of
mens rea on which to predicate liability and ensures that effective
remedies can be imposed. In Wall Products, for example, the notion
of illegal intent was buttressed by internal memoranda showing the
companies' concern about declining prices and their determination
to reverse that trend.
Third, in each implied agreement case, any noncollusive expla-
nation for the behavior of the industry seemed incredible. Again,
166. Administrative Law Judge Needleman's Initial Decision in Boise Cascade Colp. is
also of interest here because he appears to find an implicit agreement to use a delivered
pricing system. 91 F.T.C. 1, 76-78 (1978). The Federal Trade Commission relied exclu-
sively on § 5 of the FTC Act. Id. at 102. A finding of agreement might well have been
sustained by the Ninth Circuit, however, even though it reversed the § 5 finding. Boise
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit affirmed a
finding of conspiracy in a parallel private action. In Re Plywood Antitrust Litigation, 655
F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983).
167. R. Posner, supra note 8, at 73-74.
168. Apparently only minimal evidence of enjoinable conduct was offered in ..hnbook,




lack of a credible legitimate motive appears to satisfy the courts'
search for a mens rea element. If innocent explanations can be of-
fered, then doubts are resolved in favor of the defendants.' 6 9 Pos-
ner agrees that a convincing justification for business behavior that
at first glance seems suspicious ought to negate any inference of ille-
gal collusion.' 
70
Finally, the cases have required a very subjective weighing of
the evidence. For example, plaintiffs in both GM and Wall Products
introduced evidence of the defendant's concern about declining
prices. The GM court, however, concluded that this demonstrated
rational and independent reactions to economic conditions, while
the court in Wall Products reasoned that such evidence suggested a
heightened motive for collusion. Similarly, while the Justice Depart-
ment prosecutors thought that GM and Ford had improper parallel
pricing policies, the court viewed those policies as a rational re-
sponse to market conditions. Thus, the likelihood that opposite in-
ferences could be drawn from similar behavior will make it quite
difficult to predict whether a court will find an implicit agreement in
any particular context.
For these reasons, a case founded on an implicit agreement the-
ory is likely to be weak absent striking evidence that the firms in-
volved are behaving abnormally, and thus pursuant to an implied
commitment to restrain the market. Moreover, such evidence must
convincingly rebut arguments that the firms' conduct is merely
interdependent.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, caselaw indicates that Posner's conspiracy ap-
proach offers at best a limited solution to the oligopoly problem.
Posner himself acknowledges only one problem with his approach:
"the difficulty of proving collusive pricing by economic evidence,
given the complex, technical, and often inconclusive character of
such evidence."' 7 ' He responds, however, that the ambiguity of the
evidence is exaggerated and suggests that the problem could be al-
leviated by increasing the burden of proof and eliminating criminal
penalties in cases relying on economic evidence. 172
169. See, e.g., Du Pont, 729 F.2d at 140-42; General .Motors, 1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at
97,670-71.
170. R. POSNER, supra note 8, at 72. For example, simultaneous price increases might
be explained by "external shocks, such as [an] increase in raw material costs." Id.




I think that Posner is simply wrong about the ambiguity of eco-
nomic evidence. In many situations, economic analysis cannot relia-
bly distinguish legal interdependent pricing from noncompetitive
pricing resulting from an express or implicit agreement. Even in
situations in which it can do so to the satisfaction of economists,
courts may remain unconvinced. Certainly the cases examined
above suggest a marked judicial reluctance to impose antitrust sanc-
tions absent clear, unequivocal evidence. Courts have never found
evidence of poor performance in an oligopolistic industry adequate
by itself to support a finding of agreement. Rather, they have always
required evidence of some enjoinable conduct. In effect, enjoinable
conduct establishes a sort of mens rea for a finding of collusion by
demonstrating that the defendants have taken avoidable steps to re-
duce competition.
Concerted enjoinable conduct that has the purpose or effect of
restraining competition is illegal. Courts have not required proof of
the actual terms of an agreement, however. For example, they have
condemned agreements to use facilitating practices that have an an-
ticompetitive effect. The courts have also condemned less visible
agreements under two theories. First, they have inferred secret ex-
press agreements from evidence of structure, conduct, and perform-
ance that appears inconsistent with independent, noncollusive
behavior. Second, they have found implicit agreements solely on
the basis of known conduct when such conduct demonstrates a com-
mitment to restrain competition.
The likelihood of establishing an agreement under either the-
ory is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. Two factors, however,
appear to be determinative. First, evidence of direct communication
among firms strengthens a case considerably. Although the courts
have never explicitly required this type of evidence, in only a few
cases has agreement been inferred or found implicit with minimal
evidence of such communication. Moreover, I am aware of no case
in which a price-fixing agreement has been found without any direct
evidence of direct communication among the firms involved. Sec-
ond, the courts seem to look for evidence demonstrating a kind of
mens rea sufficient to assure that the defendant firms have not inno-
cently blundered into noncompetitive behavior. A plaintiff can es-
tablish such a mens rea by showing either that the firms' behavior
makes little or no sense absent an agreement, or that they have de-
liberately engaged in parallel conduct.
Only a few decisions have been successful in attacking oligo-
polistic misbehavior. Consequently, Posner's suggestion that we
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raise the standard of proof for plaintiffs seems counterproduc-
tive.113 He overestimates the potential of economic analysis and un-
derestimates the willingness of his fellow judges to attach the
heinous label "price fixer" to a defendant absent clear evidence.
Under these circumstances, raising the standard of proof when rely-
ing on economic evidence alone might well exacerbate rather than
relieve the oligopoly problem.
The real danger is that much oligopolistic misbehavior will con-
tinue because plaintiffs cannot build strong enough cases. A case
based on either the inferred or implied agreement theory is likely to
be both costly and very risky, with the court bending over backwards
to give defendants the benefit of any doubt. Even so, Posner's con-
spiracy approach remains viable-in the sense that a judgment for
the plaintiff is possible-which is more than can be said for the
shared monopoly and FTC Act facilitating practice theories.
173. While I agree that a felony conviction is unjustified if the evidence is ambiguous,
the requirement that the evidence be "beyond a reasonable doubt" precludes a criminal
conviction based on such evidence.
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